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The effect of political connections on the level and value of cash holdings: 
International evidence 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we examine the role of political connections on corporate liquidity policies and 
their consequences in an international setting. We find that managers of politically connected 
firms have a tendency to hoard more cash than their non-connected counterparts. Moreover, 
presence of political connections reduces the value of cash holdings. Further analysis reveals that 
our main findings are more pronounced for firms in emerging markets as well as for firms in 
countries with weak legal protection of investors and high levels of corruption. Overall, our 
empirical results corroborate previous findings on the agency cost explanation for corporate cash 
holdings. 
 
JEL Classification: F50; F54; G15; G34 
 
Keywords: Political connections; Cash holding; Legal protection; Corruption. 
 
 
 2
1. Introduction 
Since Keynes (1936), scholars in corporate finance have emphasized the importance of 
corporate liquidity policies, including the issue of how a company manages its cash reserves. 
There are three prominent explanations for the determinants of cash holdings. The proponents of 
the trade-off theory contend that there is an optimal level of cash balances, which is determined 
by the trade-off between the benefits and the costs of holding cash. By contrast, the pecking 
order theory suggests that there is no optimal level of cash holdings. Instead, a firm’s cash 
holdings are decided by its investment and financing activities. Essentially, cash is regarded as 
negative debt. In general, the findings in the literature with regards to U.S. firms are more 
consistent with the trade-off theory of cash holdings (Kim, Mauer, and Sherman, 1998; Opler, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 1999). 
Myers and Rajan (1998) argue that cash is perhaps the most vulnerable asset that managers 
can expropriate from the firm. Thus, the proponents of the agency cost theory counter that 
entrenched managers prefer to hoard more cash to engage in activities that are damaging to 
minority shareholders’ interests. Several recent studies have attempted to explore the relevance 
of the agency motive on the determinants as well as the consequences of cash holdings. Dittmar, 
Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) and Kalcheva and Lins (2007) find evidence supportive of the 
agency cost theory from international firms. However, Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) and 
Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) show results from U.S. firms that fail to support the theory. 
Therefore, the debate on the agency cost explanation for cash holdings is still on-going.  
Meanwhile, there are an increasing number of studies that have examined the role of political 
connections on firm value and other issues around the world. Faccio (2006) and Goldman, So, 
and Rocholl (2009) find that politically connected firms have higher firm value than their non-
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connected counterparts. One of the benefits enjoyed by politically connected firms is the easier 
access to the external capital market through preferential bank lending. Sapienza (2004) also 
finds that state-owned banks in Italy charge lower interest rates to firms affiliated with the ruling 
party than to those without such affiliations.  
However, a recent study by Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2011) finds that these connected 
firms, in general, report lower quality accounting information than their non-connected 
counterparts. Peng, Wei, and Yang (2011) and Qian, Pan, and Yeung (2011) further contend that 
managers of politically connected firms in China are more likely to expropriate minority 
shareholders through tunneling or self-dealing activities. In addition, Fan, Wang, and Zhang 
(2007) and Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar (2008) report that post-IPO performance of newly 
partially privatized state-owned enterprises is poorer for politically connected firms than for non-
connected firms. All these findings indicate that managers of politically connected firms may be 
more entrenched than their non-connected counterparts. 
In this paper, we seek to link the two strands of literature by examining the role of political 
connections on corporate liquidity policies in an international setting. Our first objective is to test 
which competing theory is better in explaining the determinants of cash holdings. Politically 
connected firms can access external bank financing more easily with more favorable terms, 
which reduces the incentives of holding cash to finance future investment needs. Therefore, the 
trade-off theory would predict a negative association between political connections and cash 
holdings. Since the pecking order theory suggests that there is no optimal level of cash holdings, 
whether a firm is politically connected or not should not affect its liquidity policy. Thus, the 
pecking order theory would predict no relation between political connections and cash holdings.  
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By contrast, the agency cost theory of cash holdings as first proposed by Dittmar, Mahrt-
Smith, and Servaes (2003) argues that entrenched managers of politically connected firms may 
still have an incentive to maintain large cash reserves, even though they can obtain external 
financing easily with preferential terms. That is, the agency motive of cash holdings conjectures 
that there exists a positive association between political connections and cash holdings.  
Using data from 8,373 firms across 24 countries, we find that the results from the cross-
sectional regressions of cash holdings on political connections are more consistent with the 
agency cost explanation. More specifically, we find that managers of politically connected firms 
display a tendency to hold more cash than their non-connected counterparts, even after 
controlling for other determinants of cash holdings. We subsequently conduct a series of 
robustness tests and show that our main finding is robust to estimation methods and model 
specifications. More importantly, our results are not affected by the extremely large number of 
observations from the U.K. and Japan. Interestingly, we further document that the positive 
relation between political connections and cash holdings is particularly strong for firms in East 
Asian countries. This finding complements those found in the existing literature that advocates 
the prevalence and the importance of political connections for firms in these countries.1  
Studies in corporate finance are often plagued by the potential endogeneity problem or self-
selection bias. In our context, the problem is related to our main variable of interest, namely the 
dummy variable indicating the presence of political connections. It is plausible that firms with 
large cash holdings are more likely to establish political connections. In order to mitigate this 
concern, we perform the Heckman (1976) two-stage procedure on a sub-sample of firms for 
which we can identify the dates when the connections were made. Our results reveal that the 
                                                          
1 Fisman (2001), Johnson and Mitton (2003), Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006), and Gul (2006) examine the 
importance of political connections in several accounting- and finance-related issues in countries such as Indonesia 
and Malaysia. 
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decision to establish a connection is not related to a firm’s cash holdings in the first-stage 
regression. More importantly, the predicted value of the political connection variable is still 
positively and significantly related to cash holdings in the second-stage regression. Our main 
finding is therefore unlikely to be driven by issues related to the endogeneity problem or self-
selection bias. 
Recent cross-country studies have identified that country-level institutional variables are 
important determinants of corporate liquidity policies for international firms.2 In this respect, we 
use three country-level variables to capture the extent of capital market development, legal 
protection of investors, and corruption. We split the whole sample into two sub-samples based on 
each of these three country-level institutional variables and estimate the cross-sectional 
regressions of cash holdings on political connections for each sub-sample. Prior studies have also 
documented that the practice of connected lending is more rampant in emerging markets as well 
as in countries with weak legal protection and high levels of corruption. We therefore posit that 
the positive association between political connections and cash holdings is more pronounced in 
these countries. Indeed, the empirical findings from the split sample regressions support our 
prediction.  
Our second objective is to examine the joint implications of political connections and cash 
holdings on firm value. If investors regard political connections as an indication of increased 
agency costs, we can expect them to put a big discount on the cash holdings of politically 
connected firms. We find evidence that the presence of political connections indeed reduces the 
value of cash holdings. Finally, our cross-sectional analysis shows that the negative association 
between political connections and the value of cash holdings is more prominent for firms in 
                                                          
2 See, for example, Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003), Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006), and 
Kusnadi and Wei (2011) for recent cross-country studies on corporate liquidity policies. 
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emerging markets as well as for those in countries with low legal protection of investors and high 
levels of corruption.  
Overall, our cross-country study provides several contributions to the literature on political 
connections and corporate liquidity policies. First, political connections provide an alternative 
channel of access to external financing, which is an important factor that drives a firm’s cash 
holdings decision. Whether the managers of connected firms still have the incentive to 
accumulate more cash reserves, even when this alternative channel is available, is an interesting 
empirical question that has not been examined previously. This study is intended to fill this gap 
by documenting that the existence of political connections is positively and significantly 
associated with cash holdings.3 
Second, we contribute to the growing literature on the value implication of cash holdings. Our 
findings from the valuation regression complement the existing studies that have suggested that 
the presence of political connections represents an important aspect of corporate governance 
mechanisms at both the firm and the country levels. We provide a clearer picture on the interplay 
between political connections, cash holdings, and firm value, and on how they are relevant for 
minority shareholders.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally develops our 
hypotheses on the relation between political connections and cash holdings as well as the value 
implications of the two. Section 3 describes our sample and main variables. Section 4 presents 
our empirical results and discusses their implications. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
                                                          
3 This finding is opposite to that of Hill, Fuller, Kelly, and Washam (2010) for U.S. firms. They find a negative 
relation between lobbying expenses (which they use as a measure of political connections) and cash holdings. In 
addition, the marginal value of holding cash also declines with lobbying activities.  
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2.1. Political connections 
Several recent studies have explored the need for firms to invest in political capital. Faccio 
(2006) examines the extent of political connections of firms around the world. She finds that 
connected firms do extract benefits from their ties to politicians, leading to an increase in firm 
value upon the announcements of new connections being established. For example, connected 
firms tend to enjoy preferential debt contracts from banks and subsidies from the government, 
and are more likely to be bailed out when they run into financial distress (Faccio, McConnell, 
and Masulis, 2006). Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven (2008) study the political contributions made 
by Brazilian firms around the 1998 and 2002 elections. They find that contributing firms 
experienced increases in their bank financing, which suggests that establishing connections has a 
favorable effect in the form of better access to external financing. Goldman, So, and Rocholl 
(2009) also report a positive announcement return when a politically connected individual is 
elected as a board member. In addition, Fishman (2001) finds that the market value of firms in 
Indonesia connected to ex-President Suharto was negatively affected by the news of his 
declining health.  
Gomez and Jomo (1997), Johnson and Mitton (2003), and Gul (2006) focus on the extent and 
consequences of political connections in Malaysia. They find that Malaysian firms do establish 
close ties to the well-known politicians and leaders of the country and that these ties have proven 
to be valuable to the firms. Specifically, Johnson and Mitton (2003) examine how political ties 
affected stock returns during the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. They find that politically 
connected firms were badly hit during the initial stage of the crisis due to the government’s slow 
response. However, when the government initiated capital controls later, which were designed 
primarily to benefit those politically connected firms, the returns of these connected firms 
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improved on average. On the other hand, Gul (2006) confirms that cronyism is prevalent in 
Malaysia and auditors in Malaysia demand higher audit fees for politically connected firms as 
these firms are more susceptible to financial statement misreporting than their peers. Peng, Wei, 
and Yang (2011) and Qian, Pan, and Yeung (2011) also find that managers of politically 
connected firms in China are more likely than non-connected firms to engage in expropriation 
through tunneling or self-dealing activities. 
Chen, Ding, and Kim (2010) argue that the existence of political connections has the effect of 
aggravating the potential information asymmetry between managers and shareholders of 
international firms. In turn, this leads to the lower accuracy of earnings forecasts made by 
analysts as it is more difficult for them to make accurate forecasts of earnings for politically 
connected firms. Additionally, the negative relation between political connections and the 
accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts is more profound for firms in countries with high levels 
of corruption.  
Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2011) further document that politically connected firms report 
poorer quality of accounting information than do non-connected firms. In addition, managers of 
these firms do not seem to face any disciplinary pressure from the external market to improve the 
disclosure quality of information. In fact, they contend that the prevailing result in the literature 
that poor disclosure quality will be penalized in terms of a higher cost of issuing debt (and 
equity) simply does not exist for politically connected firms. 
Taken together, the findings from the above mentioned studies suggest that although 
connected firms may have higher firm values and easier access to external financial markets with 
more favorable terms, they are less transparent (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006) and more 
likely to report poor quality of accounting information. Furthermore, managers of politically 
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connected firms are more entrenched and these firms might be suffering from more severe 
agency problems. 
 
2.2. Cash holdings 
2.2.1. The trade-off theory versus the pecking order theory 
The seminal work of Keynes (1936) forms the fundamental theory behind a firm’s decision to 
hold cash. In essence, the trade-off theory of cash holdings suggests that a firm’s optimal cash 
balance is determined by trading-off the cost of holding cash with the corresponding benefit. 
Having sufficient internal cash serves the shareholders’ interests, as it can act as a buffer to 
protect the firm against any cash shortfalls (the precautionary motive). This suggests that holding 
sufficient cash allows a firm to invest in projects with good investment potentials without having 
to rely on costly external financing (the transaction cost motive). Since politically connected 
firms can access external bank financing with preferential terms more easily, the benefit of 
holding cash would be reduced. As a result, the trade-off theory predicts that the relation 
between political connections and cash holdings should be negative. 
The pecking order theory argues that there is no optimal level of cash balance. A firm will 
accumulate cash reserves once its cash flow from assets is greater than that needed for financing 
purposes (i.e., to pay interest to creditors and dividends to shareholders, etc.). Similar to its 
capital structure counterpart, this theory also states that a firm will use internal cash before 
issuing debt to finance its investment needs. It will avoid going to the equity market to raise 
funds due to the higher cost involved. Essentially, cash is regarded as negative debt. Therefore, 
the pecking order theory predicts that a firm’s political connectedness should not have any effect 
on its cash holdings. 
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Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) examine the determinants of corporate cash 
reserves for U.S. firms. Their findings are in general consistent with the trade-off theory of cash 
holdings. Specifically, they find that firms hold more cash in response to increases in growth 
opportunities, investments, R&D expenditures, and the volatility of cash flows. At the same time, 
large firms and firms with large amounts of net working capital hold smaller cash balances. The 
above discussions lead to our first hypothesis. 
H1. Under the trade-off theory (the pecking order theory), the relation between political 
connections and cash holdings is negative (flat). 
 
2.2.2. The agency cost theory 
Cash is the most vulnerable asset that entrenched managers can siphon off from the firm 
(Myers and Rajan, 1998). Several recent studies have examined the importance of corporate 
governance mechanisms on the determinants of cash holdings for both U.S. and international 
firms. The study by Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) is the first to document that cash 
holdings are inversely related to the legal protection of investors (at the country level) for a 
sample of international firms. In other words, managers of firms located in countries with weaker 
legal protection of investors have a tendency to hold larger cash reserves. They argue that their 
findings are supportive of the agency cost explanation for cash holdings.4 Kalcheva and Lins 
(2007) further include the role of firm-level governance mechanisms. They find that firms with 
substantial control rights owned by the managers (implying weaker firm-level governance) have 
more incentive to hoard more cash. More importantly, this positive relation between managerial 
                                                          
4 Several studies have documented the perverse implications of being cash-rich. For example, managers of cash-
rich firms are more likely to engage in overinvestment, to consume private benefits, or to simply retain more cash 
reserves (Jensen, 1986; Lang, Stulz, and Walkling, 1991; Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1994; Harford, 
1999). 
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control rights and cash holdings is more pervasive for firms located in countries with weak legal 
protection of investors. The results highlight that corporate governance mechanisms (at both the 
firm and the country levels) play important roles in the determinants of cash holdings for 
international firms. 
However, the negative relation between corporate governance and cash holdings documented 
in the above international studies does not hold for U.S. firms. In fact, Harford, Mansi, and 
Maxwell (2008) find that firms with stronger firm-level governance hold more cash than those 
with weaker governance. They attribute the findings to the fact that those firms with weaker 
governance are more likely to engage in acquisitions as incentives for empire building, resulting 
in their smaller cash balances.5  
The findings from several studies such as those of Chen, Kim, and Ding (2010), Chaney, 
Faccio, and Parsley (2011), Peng, Wei, and Yang (2011), and Qian, Pan, and Yeung (2011) infer 
that managers of politically connected firms are likely to be entrenched. Therefore, following 
Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) and Kalcheva and Lins (2007), the agency motive of 
cash holdings implies that connected firms are more likely to hold larger cash reserves. In 
addition, the phenomenon of cronyism stemming from the existence of political connections 
tends to be more rampant among firms in emerging markets as well as firms located in countries 
with weak legal protection and high levels of corruption. If entrenchment is the motive for 
controlling shareholders to hoard excessive cash, the positive association between political 
connections and cash holdings should be stronger in these countries as well. The above 
discussions lead to our second hypothesis stated as follows: 
H2a. Under the agency cost theory, cash holdings are positively associated with political 
connections.  
                                                          
5 Bates, Kahle, and Stultz (2009) also arrive at the same conclusion. 
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H2b. In addition, this positive association is more prominent for firms in emerging markets 
and for firms located in countries with weak legal protection and high levels of corruption. 
 
2.3. The value implications of cash holdings  
Using market-to-book equity as a measure of firm value, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson 
(2006) document that country-level institutions play important roles in determining the value 
implications of cash holdings. They find that there exists an asymmetry in the value implications 
of cash holdings.  More specifically, cash holdings are valued at a premium for firms in countries 
with strong investor protection, whereas they are valued at a discount for firms in countries with 
weak legal protection of investors. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find a similar result for U.S. 
firms.6 That is, the incremental value of holding cash is positive for strongly governed firms. 
Their findings are consistent with those of Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008), who suggest 
that poorly governed firms have the tendency not to hold excessive cash reserves and, instead, 
splurge on value-destroying projects, which bear negative consequences.  
Using a sample of international firms that are cross-listed on the U.S. exchanges, Fresard and 
Salva (2010) find that excess cash holdings are valued at a premium for these cross-listed firms, 
as compared with their non-cross-listed counterparts. They attribute the valuation premium to the 
increase in monitoring as well as disclosure requirements that international firms will be subject 
to once they are cross-listed in the U.S. The extent of legal protection afforded by U.S. laws has 
the effect of curbing the entrenched managers’ incentives to use the cash for their own private 
benefits. 
                                                          
6 Faulkender and Wang (2006) use excess stock returns, instead of the market-to-book ratio, to examine the value 
of cash holdings. Their findings are generally consistent with those of Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007).  
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The conclusion from the above empirical results suggests that if investors regard managers of 
politically connected firms as entrenched, then they should value the cash holdings of politically 
connected firms at a discount. In addition, similar to H2b, we also expect that the negative 
relation between political connections and the value of cash holdings should be stronger for firms 
in emerging markets as well as for firms located in countries with weak legal protection of 
investors and high levels of corruption, which leads to our third hypothesis stated as follows:7 
H3a. Under the agency cost theory, political connections reduce the value of cash holdings.  
H3b. In addition, the negative relation between political connections and the value of cash 
holdings is more pronounced for firms in emerging markets and for firms located in countries 
with weak legal protection and high levels of corruption. 
 
3. Data source and variable construction 
One of the main variables in our study is CONN, a dummy variable representing firms that 
have established close ties to politicians or governments. The data on connected listed firms 
around the world is first obtained from Faccio (2006). The data consist of a list of 541 connected 
firms from 35 countries. According to Faccio (2006), a firm is classified as politically connected 
if, during the period 1997 through 2001, at least one of its largest shareholders (those with 
ownerships of at least 10% of the voting shares) or one of its top directors (CEO, president, vice-
president, chairman, or secretary) is a leader of the country (king, president, prime minister, or 
premier), a minister, a member of parliament, or a close relative of a politician or a political 
party.8  
                                                          
7 It appears that neither the trade-off theory nor the pecking order theory is able to generate a clear prediction on 
the relation between political connections and the value of cash holding. 
8 In our robustness tests, we further test to see whether the results are affected by whom the connections were 
established through, e.g. the major shareholder or top directors, etc. 
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Since the data on political connections were collected by Faccio (2006) during the period 
1997 through 2001, we match the data on connected firms as well as unconnected firms with 
firm-level financial data as of year 2001 from Worldscope.9 To be consistent with the existing 
literature, we exclude firms with missing firm-year observations on the financial variables, 
financial firms (i.e., firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999), small firms (i.e., firms with a 
book value of total assets of less than US$10 million), and countries with zero connected firms. 
The screening process results in a final sample of 8,373 firms from 24 countries. Among them, 
227 are connected firms.10 Table 1 reports the sample distribution. The first two columns of 
Table 1 present the distributions of all firms as well as connected firms for each of the countries 
in our final sample. The mean and standard deviation of the number of firms are 349 and 510 for 
all firms, and 9 and 15 for connected firms, respectively. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
There is a wide range of variation in the number of connected firms across our sample 
countries. The U.K. has the largest number of connected firms (66), while five countries have 
only one connected firm (Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Israel, and Spain). We also observe that 
connected firms are more prevalent in East Asian countries, with a total of 113 connected firms 
which comprises about half of all connected firms. In addition, observations from Japan and the 
U.K. dominate our international sample, making up more than 40% of the all firm sample. This 
raises an issue of whether our empirical results are mainly driven by the U.K. and/or Japan or by 
                                                          
9 We find similar results based on the test period from 1997 to 2001 or when we extend our sample to the period 
2002-2006. The results are presented in the robustness tests. 
10 This figure is about half of the original list of 541 connected firms due to the screening procedure we 
implement. Nevertheless, the number of connections we have in this paper is more than the 114 connected firms 
used by Chen, Kim, and Ding (2010) and comparable to the 209 firms used by Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2011). 
In addition, we exclude the U.S. from our sample as there are only a few connected firms in the U.S. More 
importantly, the inclusion of the U.S. will substantially increase the total number of firm-year observations and 
create a sample selection bias. 
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countries in East Asia. We will address this issue in the robustness tests by excluding firms in the 
U.K. and Japan or including firms from East Asian countries only. 
In addition, we also control for several country-level institutional factors which other studies 
have documented as relevant for cash holdings. We follow the existing literature (such as that of 
Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009) to classify 16 countries as developed markets and 8 countries as 
emerging markets. The last four columns of Table 1 present the four institutional variables 
employed in this study. LEGAL is an index of legal protection and is calculated as the average of 
the investor protection index (INVPRT) from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) 
and the anti-self-dealing index (ANTISELF) from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2008).11 LEGAL ranges from 0.14 (Mexico and Germany) to 0.91 (Hong Kong), with 
an average of 0.50 and a standard deviation of 0.23. PRIVCRED is the private credit index from 
Djankov, Liesh, and Shleifer (2007). It is calculated as the credit given by deposit-taking 
financial institutions to the private sector (from lines 22d and 42d of the International Financial 
Statistics) divided by gross domestic product (GDP) (from line 99b of the International Financial 
Statistics). PRIVCRED ranges from 0.18 (Mexico) to 1.64 (Switzerland), with an average of 0.93 
and a standard deviation of 0.39. CORRUPT is the corruption index from Corporate 
Transparency International, with a lower number indicating a higher level of corruption. 
CORRUPT ranges from -1.09 (Indonesia) to 2.54 (Finland), with an average of 1.16 and a 
standard deviation of 1.08. Lastly, CONOWN is ownership concentration from La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). It is measured as the average percentage of common 
shares owned by the three largest shareholders in the ten largest non-financial, privately-owned 
domestic firms in a given country. CONOWN ranges from 0.18 (Taiwan and Japan) to 0.64 
                                                          
11 See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2008) for details on the construction of these two indices.  
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(Mexico), with an average of 0.44 and a standard deviation of 0.14. The definitions of these 
country-level institutional variables are detailed in the Appendix. 
We compute a firm’s cash holdings (CASH) as cash and cash equivalents at the end of year t 
divided by total assets at the end of year t. We further compute other firm-level control variables 
which other studies have found to be important determinants of firms’ cash holdings. ASSET is 
the book value of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars. SIZE is the natural logarithm of ASSET 
and is taken as a proxy for firm size. VALUE is the firm value (i.e., Tobin’s Q) and is calculated 
as the ratio of the market value of the firm’s equity plus the book value of liabilities to total 
assets. CF is cash flow and is calculated as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation 
and amortization divided by total assets (both at the end of year t). NWC is net working capital 
and is calculated as the difference between current assets and current liabilities divided by total 
assets. SALESG is sales growth and is calculated as the year-on-year percentage growth in sales. 
Since we will use VALUE as a measure of firm value, SALESG will be used as a proxy for 
investment opportunities. LEV is leverage and is calculated as the ratio of total debt (long-term 
and short-term) to total assets. CAPX is capital investment and is calculated as the ratio of capital 
expenditures (changes in fixed assets plus depreciation) to total assets. RD is calculated as 
research and development expenses divided by total assets. We also define a dummy variable, 
DIVD, that equals one for dividend-paying firms and zero otherwise. We winsorize all our 
control variables except DIVD at the 1% and 99% levels to make sure that our results are not 
attributed to outliers in the data. The definitions of these firm-level financial variables are 
detailed in the Appendix. 
We report the summary statistics for the measure of firm-level political connections (CONN) 
and the financial variables in Panel A of Table 2. On average, connected firms make up 2.7% of 
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our sample, with a standard deviation of 16%. The mean and median of CASH are about 0.13 and 
0.09, respectively, while the standard deviation is 0.13. The means (medians) of CF and NWC 
are 0.07 (0.08) and 0.004 (0.007), while the standard deviations are 0.13 and 0.19, respectively. 
In terms of leverage, the mean (median) of LEV is 0.26 (0.24), with a standard deviation of 0.20. 
The firms in our international sample spend an average of 5% and 1% of their assets in capital 
expenditures and research and development, respectively. About 69% of the firms pay dividends. 
The mean (median) of Tobin’s Q (VALUE) is 1.25 (1.02), with a standard deviation of 0.78. 
Finally, the mean (median) of ASSET is US$1.13 billion ($175 million), which suggests that 
most of the firms in our sample are large and established. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
In addition, we compute the mean and median of CASH for the politically connected and non-
connected firms separately in each country and present the results in Panel B of Table 2.  We 
find that, across all countries, the median of CASH is 10.4% for connected firms, which is about 
2.9% higher than the median of CASH for non-connected firms. This provides preliminary 
evidence of the difference in cash holdings between connected and non-connected firms in 
support of the prediction of the agency cost theory. We will formally test whether connected 
firms do hold larger amounts of cash than non-connected firms in the regression analysis in the 
next section. We further observe that the median of cash holdings is higher for connected firms 
than for non-connected firms in 14 out of the 24 countries in our sample.  
 
4. Empirical results 
In this section, we perform the empirical tests on the relation between political connections 
and cash holdings, and their joint implications on firm value. 
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4.1. Determinants of cash holdings  
Following the empirical construct by Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) and 
Kalcheva and Lins (2007), we estimate equation (1) below to examine whether the presence of 
political connections is an important determinant of the level of cash holdings by pooling all 
firms across countries together: 
,
)(
8765
432110
i
k
ik
j
ij
iiii
iiiiii
uCountrydIndustryc
DIVDRDCAPXLEV
SIZESALESGNWCCFCONNaCASHLog
+++
++++
+++++=
∑∑
ββββ
ββββα
 (1) 
where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of cash holdings (Log(CASH)), ui is an 
error term, and all other variables are as defined earlier.  
We first employ the generalized least squares (GLS) method to estimate equation (1). We also 
include industry dummies (cj) to control for the industry effect. The industry classification 
follows that of Fama and French (1997). The reported p-values in all tables are based on White’s 
heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. Our coefficient of interest is 1α , which is the 
coefficient on CONN. The value of 1α  is predicted to be negative under the trade-off theory, 
zero under the pecking order theory, and positive under the agency cost theory.  
We define CASH in two different ways to see whether our results are sensitive to the definition 
of cash holdings. The first one (CASH1) is cash plus cash equivalents divided by total assets. The 
second one (CASH2) is cash plus cash equivalents divided by net assets, where net assets is 
calculated as total assets minus cash and cash equivalents. Model (1) of Table 3 reports the 
estimation results from Log(CASH1) based on the country fixed effects model. We find that 1α  
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(0.165) is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level.12 The result is inconsistent with 
the prediction of either the trade-off theory or the pecking order theory (H1). However, it is 
consistent with the prediction of the agency cost theory (H2a) that entrenched managers of 
connected firms still have the incentive to hoard more cash, even though they possess greater 
abilities to obtain the external financing needed to fund future investment projects. Our finding is 
not only statistically significant, but also economically significant. Holding other variables 
constant, we can see that, on average, politically connected firms hold 18% more cash than non-
connected firms.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) find that country-level institutional variables are 
also important determinants of cash holdings for their sample of international firms. We 
therefore also include LEGAL, PRIVCRED, and CONOWN as additional control variables in our 
cash holdings regression. Since these country-level institutional variables are the same for all 
firms in a country, we estimate equation (2) below using the country random effects GLS model: 
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where all variables are as defined previously. LEGAL, PRIVCRED, and CONOWN are used to 
control for the effects of investor protection, access to external financing, and ownership 
concentration on cash holdings, respectively. 
The estimation results from Log(CASH1) are reported in Model (3) of Table 3. We detect that 
the magnitude of the coefficient on CONN, 1α , has increased from 0.165 in Model (1) to 0.185 
and it remains statistically significant with a p-value of 0.03. Likewise, the economic 
                                                          
12 We obtain a similar result if we use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate equation (1).  
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significance of the result is substantial. On average, politically connected firms hold 20% more 
cash than their non-connected counterparts. Therefore, our main finding on the positive 
association between political connections and cash holdings remain intact even after controlling 
for country-level institutional variables. 
We also re-estimate equations (1) and (2) by replacing our dependent variable with 
Log(CASH2). The results are reported in Models (2) and (4) of Table 3, respectively. The 
coefficients on CONN are still positive and the magnitudes are slightly larger than those reported 
in Models (1) and (3), respectively, although the significance level is slightly reduced from 5% 
in Model (1) to 6% in Model (2).13 Overall, our main finding on the positive relation between 
political connections and cash holdings supports the prediction of the agency cost theory (H2a) 
but is inconsistent with that of the trade-off theory or the pecking order theory (H1).  
Unlike Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) who document a significantly negative 
relation between country-level shareholder protection (as proxied by the ANTIDIR index from La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998)) and international firms’ cash holdings, we 
find that the coefficient on LEGAL is negative but statistically insignificant at the conventional 
levels. Likewise, ownership concentration (CONOWN) is also not related to cash holdings. On 
the other hand, the coefficient on PRIVCRED is positive and marginally significant in Model (4) 
(coeff. = 0.446; p-value = 0.06). These findings corroborate those of Kalcheva and Lins (2007), 
who attribute the lack of significance of the country-level investor protection variables to the 
differences in sample size as well as the source of data.14 
                                                          
13 In our unreported tests, we use another alternative definition of cash holdings that has also been used in other 
studies: the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total sales. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar 
and are available upon request. 
14 Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) collected their sample from Global Vantage, whereas both we and 
Kalcheva and Lins (2007) collected data from Worldscope. 
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For the other firm-level determinants of cash holdings, we find that small firms, and firms 
with higher cash flow, more investment opportunities (as proxied by SALESG), and higher 
investment in research and development have a tendency to hold more cash. Meanwhile, firms 
with larger net working capital, higher leverage, and more capital expenditures hold less cash. In 
general, the signs of the coefficients (with the exception of DIVD) are largely consistent with the 
earlier findings by Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) and Kalcheva and Lins (2007). 
 
4.2. Robustness tests 
In this sub-section, we perform a series of sensitivity analysis to ensure that our results are 
robust to alternative specifications or samples. First, as shown in Table 1, the number of firms in 
our sample countries varies greatly, from less than 50 in Ireland and Israel to nearly 2,500 in 
Japan. We re-estimate equation (1) using the weighted least squares (WLS) method, where the 
weight is the inverse of the number of firms in each country. The result is displayed in Model (1) 
of Table 4. The result reveals that our main finding of a positive association between political 
connections and cash holdings (coeff. = 0.216; p-value = 0.04) remains unchanged using the 
WLS estimation method. The coefficients on the other financial variables are in general similar 
to those reported in Table 3, with the exception of SIZE and DIVD which are now positively and 
significantly associated with cash holdings.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Our results may be driven by the potential endogeneity between our dependent variable (cash 
holdings) and independent variable (political connections). We attempt to partially address this 
concern by using a sample of 77 firms for which we can identify the dates when the connections 
were established and perform a Heckman two-step test. Essentially, the dependent variable in the 
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first step of the regression is the probability that a firm is politically connected (which equals 1 in 
the year when the firm established political connections and 0 otherwise). The independent 
variables are instruments which prior studies have found to be significant in influencing a firm’s 
decision to establish political connections, such as cash flow, leverage, market-to-book equity, 
sales growth, the LEGAL and CORRUPT indexes, and whether a firm’s headquarter is located in 
the capital city of the country. We find that cash holdings have no significant association with 
the likelihood of establishing political connections. Subsequently, we use the predicted value of 
the political connections variable from the first step of the regression as an independent variable 
in the second step of the regression on cash holdings. The unreported results show that the 
coefficient on the predicted value of political connections continues to be positive and 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.01). 
Next, we include lagged Log(CASH), denoted as LCASH, in equation (1). The result is 
reported in Model (2) of Table 4. While LCASH is itself positively and highly significantly 
associated with cash holdings, its inclusion in equation (1) does not affect the main result in 
terms of the sign or the statistical significance level of the coefficient on CONN.  
We further examine whether our main finding on the association between political 
connections and cash holdings is driven by who the connections were established through. In 
particular, we construct five additional dummy variables: (i) CONN_OWN which equals 1 if the 
connection was established through one of the largest shareholders and 0 otherwise, and (ii) 
CONN_DIR which equals 1 if the connection was established through the top director and 0 
otherwise.15 Likewise, CONN_LEADER, CONN_MP, and CONN_CLOSE are used to represent 
companies in which at least one of the largest shareholders or top directors of the company is a 
                                                          
15 There are 93 and 142 firms who established their connections through the owner and the director of the firm, 
respectively, representing 1.1% and 1.7% of all firms in our sample. 
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leader of the country, a member of parliament, or a close relative or friend of at least one top 
politician, respectively.16 We replace CONN in equation (1) with CONN_OWN and CONN_DIR 
in one specification and with CONN_LEADER, CONN_MP, and CONN_CLOSE in another 
specification and re-estimate equation (1) using the country fixed effects GLS model. Our results 
(unreported) reveal that only the coefficients on CONN_DIR and CONN_CLOSE exhibit positive 
and significant associations with cash holdings.  These findings corroborate those of Faccio 
(2010) who also finds that the differences between connected and non-connected firms become 
more pronounced when the connections are established through the owner or close relationship 
with a top politician. 
In order to alleviate the concern that our empirical finding may be driven by observations 
from large countries, we remove Japan and the U.K. from our sample as these are the two 
countries with the largest and second largest numbers of firms. The results in Model (3) of Table 
4 show that the magnitude of the coefficient on CONN is now 0.276 and has become significant 
at the 1% level. 
Anecdotal evidence as well as recent empirical studies have highlighted that political 
connections are more prevalent for firms in East Asian countries. Consequently, we are also 
interested in assessing whether the positive relation between political connections and cash 
holdings is stronger for firms in these countries. Model (5) of Table 4 affirms our conjecture as 
the coefficient on CONN is positive and significant for the sample of East Asian countries, but 
not significant for the other countries (unreported).  
Our analysis has so far only used observations from one year (2001). This raises a concern of 
whether the results will still hold in other sample periods. Therefore, we extend our sample to 
                                                          
16 There are 85, 140, and 63 firms who have one of their largest shareholders or top directors as a leader of the 
country, a member of the parliament, or a close relative of at least one top politician, respectively. This represents 
1.0%, 1.7%, and 0.8% of al firms in our sample. 
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cover not only the period from 1997 to 2001 (the sample period during which the connections 
were established) but also the period from 2002 to 2006. We further include year dummies in 
equation (1) and estimate the regression for the extended panel data using the country fixed 
effects GLS model. The results in Models (6) and (7) of Table 4 confirm that our main results are 
the same in both sample periods. 
In summary, our robustness checks in general confirm our findings in Table 3. More 
specifically, the results from robustness checks are consistent with our conjecture that managers 
of politically connected firms are entrenched and have a tendency to hold more cash than 
managers of non-connected firms. 
 
4.3. Country-level institutions, political connections, and cash holdings 
After establishing that political connections are positively associated with corporate cash 
holdings, we further examine if this relation varies according to the strength of country-level 
institutions. H2b predicts that the positive relation between political connections and cash 
holdings should be more pronounced for firms in emerging markets as well as for firms in 
countries with weak legal protection and high levels of corruption.  
Following the classification of market development introduced by Fernandes and Ferreira 
(2009), our sample comprises 16 developed and 8 emerging markets. For the other two 
institutional variables, we use the median of each variable to partition our sample into two sub-
groups: (i) low legal protection if LEGAL is below the median and high legal protection 
otherwise; (ii) low corruption if CORRUPT is above the median and high corruption otherwise. 
To evaluate whether country-level attributes exert different impacts on the relation between 
political connections and cash holdings, for each partitioning variable, we estimate equation (1) 
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on the two split sub-samples of firms simultaneously. One advantage of using this estimation 
specification is that we can test the difference in the coefficient of CONN between the two sub-
samples. 
The results are reported in Models (1) to (6) of Table 5. We find that the positive effect of 
political connections on cash holdings remains significant only for the sample of firms in 
emerging markets in Model (2) (coeff. = 0.297; p-value = 0.03), firms in countries with low legal 
protection in Model (3) (coeff. = 0.274; p-value < 0.01), and firms in countries with high levels 
of corruption in Model (6) (coeff. = 0.284; p-value = 0.03). Moreover, the difference in the 
coefficient of CONN between the two sub-samples is significant for all of the country-level 
partitioning variables (with all p-values < 0.01). Therefore, our results support the prediction of 
H2b that the presence of strong institutions (measured by strong legal protection and low 
corruption) has a moderating effect on the incentives of politically connected firms to hoard 
cash, especially for firms in developed markets. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Interestingly, we observe that LEGAL is now negatively and significantly related to cash 
holdings in five out of the six specifications in Table 5, which is consistent with the finding of 
Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003). Meanwhile, we find an asymmetry in the effect of 
PRIVCRED on cash holdings. In particular, PRIVCRED is negatively and significantly related to 
cash holdings for firms in developed markets and countries with low levels of corruption, but 
positively related to cash holdings for firms in emerging markets and countries with high levels 
of corruption. CONOWN is still not associated with cash holdings, except for the two sub-
samples partitioned by LEGAL.  
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As an alternative test, we include two additional control variables: a dummy variable to 
represent countries in emerging markets (EMERGING) and an interaction term between 
EMERGING and CONN in the regression. More specifically, we estimate equation (3) below 
using the country random effects GLS model: 
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where all variables are as defined previously. In our unreported results for the pooled sample, the 
coefficient of CONN becomes negative but not statistically significant at any conventional levels. 
However, we do find that the coefficient on the interaction term displays the expected positive 
sign (coeff. = 0.377) and is highly significant (p-value < 0.01), which again confirms the 
prediction of H2b. Similarly, we replace EMERGING with LEGAL or CORRUPT and re-
estimate equation (3) using the country random effects GLS model. The results (unreported) 
corroborate the findings in Table 5 as the coefficients on the interaction term are both negative 
and significant (both p-values < 0.01).  
To summarize, we have established that firms with close ties to politicians have greater 
tendencies to hold larger cash balances than firms that have no such connections. This finding is 
supportive of the agency cost explanation (H2a) for cash holdings and the support is more 
prominent for firms in the emerging markets as well for those in countries with weak legal 
protection and high levels of corruption (H2b). 
 
4.4. Political connections and the value of holding cash 
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Our final task is to examine the value implication of cash holdings in the presence of political 
connections. We estimate equation (4) below using the country fixed effects GLS model: 
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where VALUE is the firm value, measured as Tobin’s Q. All other variables are as defined 
previously.  
If cash holdings and political connections are deemed to be valuable to a firm, we expect both 
the coefficients on cash holdings ( 1β ) and political connections ( 1α ) to be positive. The results 
in Model (1) of Table 6 demonstrate that the coefficient on CONN is positive but insignificant.17 
In addition, the coefficient on CASH is positive and significant with a value of 1.678, suggesting 
that a dollar of cash holdings contributes $1.678 to firm value for firms without connections. 
More importantly, the coefficient of the interaction term, 2α , which measures the effect of 
political connections on the incremental (marginal) value of holding cash, is negative (coeff. = -
1.101) and significant at the 10% level (p-value of 0.08). This suggests that the value of one 
dollar of cash is reduced by $1.101 for connected firms compared to non-connected firms. In 
other words, one dollar of cash is worth only $0.577 for connected firms. The result is consistent 
with the prediction of H3a that if managers are entrenched, we should expect investors to 
discount the cash holdings of politically connected firms significantly. In terms of the economic 
significance, holding other variables constant, the difference in firm value (VALUE) attributed to 
                                                          
17 While the finding on the effect of CONN on firm value might appear inconsistent with that of Faccio (2006), it is 
noted that Faccio finds an increase in firm value (i.e., cumulative abnormal returns) only for the sample of firms that 
established new connections between 1997 and 2001. When we extend our sample to cover the same period (1997 to 
2001), the coefficient on CONN is positive and significant at the 1% level (see Model (6) of Table 6). 
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cash holdings between connected and non-connected firms is computed to be about -0.146, 
which represents a net reduction of 66% in the value of cash holdings.18  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
As an alternative, we also test the value of excess cash holdings. We compute the excess cash 
holdings for each firm as follows. First, Log(CASH) is regressed against the control variables that 
have been found to determine corporate cash holdings.19 We then use the estimated coefficients 
to predict the optimal level of cash holdings for each firm, and use the residual from the 
regression to measure excess cash holdings. We find that 42% of our sample firms have positive 
excess cash holdings. We construct a dummy variable, EXCSHD, which equals one for firms 
with positive excess cash holdings and zero otherwise.  We replace CASH with EXCSHD and re-
estimate equation (3) using the country fixed effects GLS model. The results (untabulated) show 
that while the coefficients on CONN and EXCSHD are both positive and significant, the 
coefficient of the interaction term, CONN×EXCSHD, is negative and significant at the 10% level 
(p-value = 0.06). In other words, the results from the valuation regression are similar whether we 
use the raw level of cash holdings or a dummy variable representing if a firm has positive excess 
cash holdings or not. 
We also perform robustness tests for the valuation regression as we have done in Table 4 for 
the regression of cash holdings. The results are reported in Models (2) to (5) of Table 6. We 
continue to find a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term (CONN×CASH) 
using the weighted least squares (WLS) estimation method (Model (3)) as well as for the sample 
of firms from East Asian countries only (Model (5)). Although the coefficient of CONN×CASH 
                                                          
18 The computation is as follows. The difference in VALUE attributed to cash holdings between connected and 
non-connected firms is -1.101×0.133 = -0.146 based on the mean cash holdings of 0.133 (Table 2). The percentage 
difference in the value of cash holdings is -0.146/(1.678 × 0.133) = 65.6%. 
19 Our unreported results show that the effects and significances of the control variables are found to be 
qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 3. It is noted that CONN is not included in our optimal cash holdings 
regression. 
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is still negative it becomes insignificant, when we use the country random effects GLS 
estimation method (Model (2)) or when we exclude the observations from Japan and the U.K. 
(Model (4)), possibly due to the smaller sample size. In fact, the coefficient of CONN×CASH 
from Model (4) which excludes the firms from Japan and the U.K. is very close to that of 
baseline Model (1): -1.001 versus -1.1001. 
We next extend our test period from a single year (2001) to multiple years (1997 to 2001 as 
well as 2002 to 2006). To fully utilize these multiple years of data, we adopt an alternative 
methodology, first proposed by Fama and French (1998), to examine the joint effects of political 
connections and cash holdings on firm value. The regression specification is as follows: 
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where dXt denotes the change in variable X from year t-1 to year t, scaled by total assets in year t-
1; dXt+1 is defined similarly; E is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax 
credits, and investment tax credits; NA is net assets; I is interest expenses; and D is the common 
dividends paid.  
The regression results are presented in Models (6) and (7) of Table 6 for the sample period 
1997 through 2001 and the sample period 2002 through 2006, respectively. For the sake of 
brevity, we do not report the coefficients on the lag and lead changes of control variables.20 The 
coefficient of the interaction term ( CASHCONN× ) is negative and significant only for the 
sample period 1997 through 2001 (coeff. = -0.609; p-value = 0.02) in Model (6). In addition, the 
coefficient of CASH in Model (6) is 1.233, which is highly significant. We interpret the marginal 
                                                          
20 The complete results are available from the authors upon request. 
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effect of an incremental dollar held by an average firm as follows. On average, a dollar of cash 
holdings has a marginal value of $1.233 for non-connected firms. However, this value is reduced 
by $0.609 for connected firms. So a dollar of cash holdings is worth only $0.624 for connected 
firms.  These results highlight the significant discount that investors impose on the cash holdings 
of politically connected firms. The coefficient of CASHCONN×  is still negative although 
insignificant (coeff. = -0.337; p-value = 0.19) for the 2002-2006 period. This reduced effect may 
be due to the fact that while the connections were established in 1997-2001, the test period is 
2002-2006. 
 
4.5. Country-level institutions, political connections, and the value of holding cash 
Finally, we examine whether the strength of country-level institutions affect the association 
between political connections and the value of holding cash. Following Table 5, we split all 
sample firms into two sub-samples (low and high) based on market development, legal 
protection, or the level of corruption. The results are reported in Table 7. The regression results 
from Table 7 corroborate the earlier findings in Table 5 that the negative implication of political 
connections on the value of cash holdings is valid only for the sample of firms in emerging 
markets (Model (2)) and in countries with low legal protection (Model (3)) and high levels of 
corruption (Model (6)). The results support H3b.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
5. Conclusions 
In light of the recent global liquidity crisis around the world, the importance of corporate 
liquidity policies and their consequences cannot be overlooked. Using an international sample of 
politically connected and non-connected firms, we examine the impact of political connections 
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on firms’ decisions to hold cash balances, as well as the valuation implications of political 
connections and cash holdings. Our evidence reveals that managers of politically connected 
firms are more likely to hold larger cash balances than their non-connected counterparts. The 
results are robust to alternative estimation methods and sample specifications as well as 
considerations of endogeneity.  We argue that the findings are more consistent with the agency 
cost explanation for cash holdings suggested by Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) and 
Kalcheva and Lins (2007) than with the trade-off theory or the pecking order theory. More 
crucially, the results from the valuation regressions indicate that political connections may 
represent an important aspect of corporate governance mechanisms. Investors regard the 
managers of politically connected firms as entrenched and regard their tendencies to accumulate 
more cash as one of the means to extract private benefits. Therefore, the presence of political 
connections exerts a negative impact on the value of cash holdings.  
Taken as a whole, we add fresh evidence to the ongoing debate on the agency cost 
explanation for cash holdings by establishing that the presence of political connections is an 
important determinant of a firm’s corporate liquidity policy. In addition, the results from the 
cross-sectional regressions on split sub-samples suggest that the differences in the pattern of cash 
holdings and in the valuation implication between connected and non-connected firms are also 
driven by the cross-country differences in country-level institutions. Specifically, our main 
findings are stronger for firms in emerging countries as well as for those in countries with weak 
legal protection of investors and high levels of corruption.  
As a concluding note, we raise one caveat that is perhaps relevant for future research. The 
connection variable that represents the focus in this study may be outdated (as the connections 
were recorded for the period 1997 through 2001) and under represented. Some connections 
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might not have been recorded or might have been missed due to a lack of information. Hence, 
the evolution of political connections over time should be inspected as some firms may have 
established new connections, while others may have severed old ones. This can potentially be an 
interesting and rewarding avenue for future research. 
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Appendix 
Definitions of variables 
 
Variable name Description 
Firm-level variables  
CONN 
 
A connection dummy variable, which equals 1 for politically connected firms, and 0 
otherwise. 
ASSET 
 
Book value of total assets (in million US dollars). 
 
SIZE 
 
Natural logarithm of ASSET, used as a proxy for firm size. 
 
CASH 
 
Cash balance, which is cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets. 
 
CF 
 
Cash flow, which is income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and 
amortization divided by total assets. 
NWC 
 
Net working capital, which is net working capital divided by total assets. 
 
SALESG 
 
Sales growth rate, which is one-year percentage change in total sales. 
 
LEV 
 
Leverage, which is the sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by total assets. 
 
CAPX 
 
Capital investment, which is capital expenditures divided by total assets. 
 
RD 
 
R&D, which is research and development expenses divided by total assets. 
 
DIVD 
 
A dividend dummy variable, which equals 1 for firms that paid dividends during the 
financial year, and 0 otherwise. 
VALUE (Q) 
 
Firm value or Tobin’s Q, which is measured as market value of assets plus book value of 
liabilities divided by book value of total assets, used as a proxy for firm value. 
  
Institutional variables  
EMERGING 
 
An emerging market dummy variable, which equals 1 for countries in the emerging 
markets, and 0 otherwise. 
LEGAL 
 
The legal protection index, calculated as the average of the investor protection index 
(from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006)) and the anti-self-dealing index 
(from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008)). 
PRIVCRED 
 
The private credit index from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), calculated as the 
ratio of the credit given by deposit-taking financial institutions to the private sector to
GDP. 
CORRUPT 
 
The corruption index for the year 2001, from Corporate Transparency International. 
 
CONOWN 
 
 
Ownership concentration, measured as the average percentage of common shares owned 
by the largest three shareholders in the ten largest non-financial, privately-owned 
domestic firms in a given country, from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1998). 
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Table 1 
Sample distribution and country-level institutional variables 
 
This table presents the distribution of all firms (both connected and non-connected firms) and politically connected 
firms for each country in year 2001 and country-level institutional variables. LEGAL is the legal protection index, 
calculated as the average of the investor protection index (from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006)) and 
the anti-self-dealing index (from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008)). PRIVCRED is the 
private credit index from Djankov, McLiesh, and and Shleifer (2007), calculated as the ratio of the credit given by 
deposit taking financial institutions to the private sector to GDP. CORRUPT is the corruption index for year 2001, 
from Corporate Transparency International. CONOWN is ownership concentration, measured as the average 
percentage of common shares owned by the top three shareholders in the ten largest non-financial, privately-owned 
domestic firms in a given country, from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
 
Country All firms Connected firms LEGAL PRIVCRED CORRUPT CONOWN 
Developed markets 
Austria 62 1 0.16 1.04 1.93 0.58 
Belgium 81 1 0.31 0.78 1.36 0.54 
Denmark 99 3 0.41 1.23 2.36 0.45 
Finland 111 2 0.47 0.58 2.54 0.37 
France 526 11 0.43 0.87 1.46 0.34 
Germany 475 3 0.14 1.18 1.72 0.48 
Hong Kong 374 2 0.91 1.54 1.44 0.54 
Ireland 31 1 0.64 1.1 1.55 0.39 
Israel 22 1 0.66 0.89 1.25 0.51 
Italy 162 7 0.31 0.79 0.89 0.58 
Japan 2,494 22 0.46 1.07 1.38 0.18 
Singapore 279 8 0.89 1.17 2.5 0.49 
Spain 96 1 0.46 1.06 1.66 0.51 
Sweden 161 2 0.36 0.72 2.48 0.28 
Switzerland 161 3 0.29 1.64 2.22 0.41 
U.K. 994 66 0.87 1.36 2.17 0.19 
Emerging markets 
India 252 6 0.68 0.3 -0.21 0.4 
Indonesia 178 19 0.58 0.2 -1.09 0.58 
Malaysia 476 39 0.84 1.38 0.18 0.54 
Mexico 72 6 0.14 0.18 -0.39 0.64 
Philippines 73 2 0.52 0.41 -0.49 0.57 
South Korea 569 4 0.42 0.93 0.45 0.23 
Taiwan 375 5 0.56 0.99 0.72 0.18 
Thailand 250 12 0.59 1.00 -0.34 0.47 
TOTAL 8,373 227     
Mean 349 9 0.50 0.93 1.16 0.44 
Std Dev 510 15 0.23 0.39 1.08 0.14 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A of this table presents the descriptive statistics for the measure of firm-level political connections and control 
variables. CONN is a dummy variable which equals 1 for firms with connections to the politicians and 0 otherwise. 
CASH is cash holdings, calculated as cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets. CF is cash flow, calculated 
as income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. NWC is net working 
capital, calculated as current assets minus current liabilities divided by total assets. SALESG is sales-growth, 
calculated as the one-year percentage change in total sales. LEV is leverage, calculated as total debt (short-term and 
long-term) divided by total assets. CAPX is capital investment, calculated as capital expenditures divided by total 
assets. RD is research and development, calculated as research and development expenses divided by total assets. 
DIVD is a dummy variable, which equals 1 for dividend-paying firms and 0 otherwise. VALUE is Tobin’s Q, 
calculated as the market value of equity plus book value of liabilities, divided by total assets. ASSET is the book 
value of total assets (in million US dollars). Panel B of this table presents the distribution of means and medians of 
CASH for politically connected and non-connected firms in each country in year 2001.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variables N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
CONN 8,373 0.027  0.162   
CASH 8,373 0.133 0.090 0.132 0.000 0.643 
CF 8,373 0.070 0.082 0.127 -0.423 0.403 
NWC 8373 0.004 0.007 0.186 -0.546 0.477 
SALESG 8,373 0.123 0.051 0.403 -0.581 2.658 
LEV 8,373 0.259 0.239 0.201 0.000 0.822 
CAPX 8,373 0.050 0.034 0.052 0.000 0.317 
RD 8,373 0.010 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.176 
DIVD 8,373 0.687 1.000 0.464 0.000 1.000 
VALUE (Tobin’s Q) 8,373 1.245 1.017 0.784 0.495 5.750 
ASSET 8,373 1,130 175.45 3,509 12.02 26,992 
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Panel B: Mean and median of CASH 
 Mean CASH Median CASH 
Country 
 
Non-Connected 
firms 
Connected 
firms 
Non-Connected 
firms 
Connected 
firms 
Austria 0.094 0.109 0.058 0.109 
Belgium 0.108 0.092 0.066 0.092 
Denmark 0.113 0.107 0.060 0.037 
Finland 0.129 0.153 0.071 0.153 
France 0.125 0.135 0.085 0.113 
Germany 0.138 0.024 0.066 0.025 
Hong Kong 0.185 0.320 0.150 0.320 
India 0.057 0.025 0.026 0.026 
Indonesia 0.106 0.100 0.067 0.066 
Ireland 0.153 0.122 0.113 0.122 
Israel 0.115 0.052 0.086 0.052 
Italy 0.127 0.133 0.077 0.127 
Japan 0.151 0.140 0.121 0.141 
Malaysia 0.104 0.104 0.063 0.072 
Mexico 0.059 0.061 0.040 0.026 
Philippines 0.074 0.088 0.039 0.088 
Singapore 0.152 0.225 0.098 0.279 
South Korea 0.126 0.082 0.083 0.070 
Spain 0.075 0.202 0.042 0.202 
Sweden 0.152 0.049 0.100 0.049 
Switzerland 0.153 0.131 0.100 0.138 
Taiwan 0.126 0.055 0.095 0.050 
Thailand 0.084 0.080 0.043 0.080 
U.K. 0.139 0.090 0.065 0.060 
Mean 0.119 0.112 0.076 0.104 
Std Dev 0.033 0.066 0.029 0.075 
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Table 3 
Political connections and cash holdings 
 
This table presents the regression results of cash holdings (Log(CASH)) on political connections (CONN). In Models 
(1) and (3), CASH is defined as cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets (CASH1). In Models (2) and (4), 
CASH is defined as cash and cash equivalents divided by net assets (CASH2). CONN is a dummy variable which 
equals 1 for politically connected firms and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in the Appendix. The p-
value for each coefficient is reported in parentheses and is based on White’s heteroskedasticity-corrected standard 
error.  *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent 
variables 
Log(CASH1) 
country FE 
Log(CASH2) 
country FE 
Log(CASH1) 
country RE 
Log(CASH2) 
country RE 
CONN 0.165** 0.171* 0.185** 0.195** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
CF 0.235* 0.185 0.074 -0.001 
 (0.05) (0.18) (0.54) (1.00) 
NWC -1.064*** -1.271*** -1.078*** -1.298*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SALESG 0.144*** 0.153*** 0.190*** 0.207*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE -0.006 -0.018* -0.018** -0.030*** 
 (0.44) (0.05) (0.03) (0.00) 
LEV -2.406*** -2.802*** -2.587*** -3.015*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPX -1.355*** -1.688*** -1.280*** -1.581*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
RD 4.202*** 5.046*** 5.729*** 6.750*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DIVD 0.043 0.034 0.001 -0.015 
 (0.18) (0.33) (0.98) (0.67) 
LEGAL   -0.233 -0.250 
   (0.57) (0.57) 
PRIVCRED   0.400 0.446* 
   (0.11) (0.09) 
CONOWN   -0.482 -0.520 
   (0.45) (0.44) 
# of obs. 8,373 8,373 8,373 8,373 
Adj. R2 0.294 0.304 0.179 0.197 
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Table 4 
Robustness test results on the relation between political connections and cash holdings 
 
This table presents the regression results of cash holdings (Log(CASH)) on political connections (CONN). CASH is 
defined as cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets and CONN is a dummy variable which equals 1 for 
politically connected firms and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in the Appendix. Model (1) reports the 
results based on the weighted least squares (WLS) estimation method, where the weight is the inverse of the number 
of firms in each country. Model (2) also includes lagged Log(CASH), denoted as LCASH, in the regression. Model 
(3) excludes firms from Japan and the U.K. Model (4) includes firms from East Asian countries only. Model (5) 
covers the period 1997 through 2001, and Model (6) covers the period 2002 through 2006. The p-value for each 
coefficient is reported in parentheses and is based on White’s heteroskedasticity-corrected standard error.  *, **, *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent 
variables 
WLS Including 
LCASH 
Excluding 
Japan/UK 
East Asia 
only 
1997-2001 
 
2002-2006 
CONN 0.216** 0.161** 0.276*** 0.281** 0.150** 0.161*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
LCASH  5.436***     
  (0.00)     
CF 0.458** 1.106*** 0.339** 1.437*** 0.434*** 0.390*** 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
NWC -0.781*** -0.309** -0.811*** -0.963*** -1.404*** -0.952*** 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SALESG 0.208*** -0.045 0.157*** 0.064 0.147*** 0.069*** 
 (0.00) (0.34) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE 0.028* 0.063*** -0.007 -0.062*** 0.019*** -0.017*** 
 (0.08) (0.00) (0.57) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LEV -2.287*** -0.762*** -2.408*** -2.276*** -2.382*** -2.349*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPX -0.692* -0.855*** -1.122*** -1.912*** -1.606*** -1.097*** 
 (0.10) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.10) 
RD 4.874*** 0.419 4.206*** 2.380*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.00) (0.50) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DIVD 0.114** 0.128*** 0.177*** 0.140*** 0.018 0.101*** 
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.31) (0.00) 
# of obs. 8,373 8,365 4,885 4,499 35,265 48,905 
Adj. R2 0.280 0.509 0.286 0.336 0.273 0.280 
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Table 5 
Country-level institutions, political connections, and cash holdings 
 
This table presents the regression results of cash holdings (Log(CASH)) on political connections (CONN). CASH is 
defined as cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets and CONN is a dummy variable which equals 1 for 
politically connected firms and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in the Appendix. All firms are split 
into two sub-samples based on (i) market development following Fernandes and Ferreira (2009): developed markets 
(Model (1)) and emerging markets (Model (2)); (ii) the legal protection of investors (LEGAL): low legal protection 
countries (Model (3)) and high legal protection countries (Model (4)); and (iii) the level of corruption (CORRUPT): 
low corruption countries (Model (5)) and high corruption countries (Model (6)). The p-value for each coefficient is 
reported in parentheses and is based on White’s heteroskedasticity-corrected standard error.  *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent 
variables 
Developed 
markets 
Emerging 
markets 
Low 
legal protection 
High 
legal protection 
Low 
corruption 
High 
corruption 
CONN -0.107 0.297** 0.274*** 0.032 -0.110 0.284** 
 (0.34) (0.03) (0.00) (0.79) (0.34) (0.03) 
CF -0.333** 1.857*** -0.093 0.332* -0.363*** 1.753*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.52) (0.09) (0.01) (0.00) 
NWC -1.722*** -0.629*** -0.989*** -1.259*** -1.728*** -0.656*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SALESG 0.061 0.056 0.125*** 0.146*** 0.064 0.071 
 (0.13) (0.43) (0.01) (0.00) (0.12) (0.31) 
SIZE 0.011 -0.023 -0.019** 0.073*** 0.012 -0.018 
 (0.25) (0.21) (0.03) (0.00) (0.25) (0.30) 
LEV -2.576*** -1.657*** -2.072*** -3.000*** -2.575*** -1.719*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPX -2.856*** -1.476*** -1.894*** -0.965** -2.943*** -1.431*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) 
RD 2.970*** 5.485*** 2.884*** 6.782*** 2.969*** 5.644*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DIVD 0.035 0.235*** 0.107*** -0.059 0.043 0.208*** 
 (0.37) (0.00) (0.00) (0.30) (0.28) (0.00) 
LEGAL -0.448*** -1.213*** -0.084 -1.832*** -0.443*** -1.165*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.77) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PRIVCRED -0.151** 0.529*** 0.281*** 0.608*** -0.180** 0.515*** 
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
CONOWN -0.134 -0.246 -1.595*** 1.975*** -0.079 -0.262 
 (0.20) (0.24) (0.00) (0.00) (0.50) (0.12) 
Difference in 
CONN 
0.414 
(0.00) 
0.306 
(0.00) 
0.394 
(0.00) 
# of obs. 6,106 2,267 5,142 3,231 5,944 2,429 
Adj. R2 0.223 0.261 0.275 0.266 0.223 0.262 
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Table 6. Political connections and the value of holding cash 
 
This table presents the regression results of firm value (VALUE) on political connections (CONN). VALUE is 
Tobin’s Q and CONN is a political connection dummy variable. E is earnings before extraordinary items plus 
interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits, I is interest expense, RD is research and development, and 
D is the common dividends paid. All other variables are as defined in the Appendix. Model (1) reports regression 
results using the country fixed effects (FE) model, Model (2) the country random effects (RE) model, and Model (3) 
the weighted least squares (WLS) method. Model (4) excludes firms from Japan and the U.K. and Model (5) 
includes firms from East Asian countries only. Model (6) covers the period 1997 through 2001 and Model (7) covers 
the period 2002 through 2006. The p-value for each coefficient is reported in parentheses and is based on White’s 
heteroskedasticity-corrected standard error. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Independent 
variables 
Country 
FE 
Country 
RE 
WLS 
 
Exclude 
Japan/UK 
East Asian 
only 
1997-2001 
 
2002-2006 
  
CONN 0.072 0.126* 0.089 0.067 0.110 0.160*** 0.084** 
 (0.35) (0.07) (0.23) (0.42) (0.13) (0.00) (0.01) 
CASH 1.678*** 1.101*** 1.624*** 1.625*** 1.340*** 1.233*** 0.972*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CONN×CASH -1.101* -0.433 -1.085* -1.001 -0.987** -0.609** -0.337 
 (0.08) (0.51) (0.08) (0.15) (0.02) (0.02) (0.19) 
CF 0.984*** 1.199*** 1.096*** 1.039*** 0.232   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.23)   
SIZE 0.014* 0.010* 0.006 0.005 -0.028**   
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.47) (0.58) (0.02)   
LEV -0.028 0.126** 0.041 0.034 0.548***   
 (0.72) (0.01) (0.61) (0.70) (0.00)   
CAPX 1.168*** 1.380*** 0.872*** 0.816*** 1.023***   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)   
DIVD -0.103*** -0.115*** -0.139*** -0.135*** -0.015   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.65)   
E      0.602*** 0.492*** 
      (0.00) (0.00) 
I      3.823 0.561 
      (0.69) (0.94) 
RD      0.008*** 0.004*** 
      (0.00) (0.00) 
D      3.389*** 3.483*** 
      (0.00) (0.00) 
LEGAL  0.122***      
  (0.01)      
PRIVCRED  -0.018      
  (0.61)      
CONOWN  -0.043      
  (0.43)      
# of obs. 8,373 8,373 8,373 4,885 4,499 32,222 36,710 
Adj. R2 0.101 0.164 0.147 0.145 0.136 0.357 0.313 
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Table 7 
Country-level institutions, political connections, and the value of holding cash 
 
This table presents the regression results of firm value (VALUE) on political connections (CONN). VALUE is 
Tobin’s Q, calculated as the market value of equity plus book value of liabilities, divided by total assets. CONN is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 for politically connected firms and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in 
the Appendix. All firms are split into two sub-samples based on (i) market development following Fernandes and 
Ferreira (2009): developed markets (Model (1)) and emerging markets (Model (2)); (ii) the legal protection of 
investors (LEGAL): low legal protection countries (Model (3)) and high legal protection countries (Model (4)); and 
(iii) the level of corruption (CORRUPT): low corruption countries (Model (5)) and high corruption countries (Model 
(6)). The p-value for each coefficient is reported in parentheses and is based on White’s heteroskedasticity-corrected 
standard error.  *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent 
variables 
Developed 
markets 
Emerging 
markets 
Low 
legal protection 
High 
legal protection 
Low 
corruption 
High 
corruption 
CONN 0.138 0.195*** 0.213*** -0.252 0.142 0.144** 
 (0.17) (0.01) (0.00) (0.18) (0.17) (0.04) 
CASH 0.916*** 1.741*** 1.464*** 0.982*** 0.963*** 1.553*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CONN×CASH -0.181 -1.341*** -1.504*** 2.637 -0.142 -1.148*** 
 (0.84) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.88) (0.01) 
LEGAL 0.127** 0.819*** 0.629*** 0.407** 0.124** 0.300*** 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) 
PRIVCRED -0.078 -0.315*** -0.175*** 0.093 -0.046 -0.199*** 
 (0.18) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.44) (0.00) 
CONOWN 0.007 -0.391*** -0.866*** 0.682*** -0.045 0.094 
 (0.92) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.57) (0.31) 
CF 1.418*** 0.703*** 1.080*** 1.287*** 1.445*** 0.603*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE 0.012* -0.019* -0.014 0.019*** 0.012* -0.008 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.20) (0.00) (0.06) (0.45) 
LEV -0.020 0.426*** 0.460*** -0.000 -0.006 0.367*** 
 (0.74) (0.00) (0.00) (0.99) (0.93) (0.00) 
CAPX 1.471*** 0.879*** 1.268*** 0.980*** 1.530*** 0.883*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DIVD -0.149*** -0.094*** -0.066** -0.120*** -0.149*** -0.069** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
Difference in 
CONN×CASH -1.160 (0.00) -4.141 (0.00) -1.006 (0.00) 
# of obs. 6,106 2,267 5,142 3,232 5,944 2,429 
Adj. R2 0.171 0.216 0.178 0.202 0.174 0.193 
 
